Abstract. Workers competing in a tournament for a given prize, say a promotion, often perform sequentially in multiple stages. When the …rm is privately informed about the workers' performance, it can enhance the incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results. But, the policies that enhance …nal stage e¤ort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage. The optimal disclosure policy has a simple form: disclose only if all workers perform poorly. This result o¤ers a novel justi…cation for partial disclosure in performance feedback. Also, it is in sharp contrast with the existing literature that advocates for extreme policies of 'full-disclosure 'and 'no-disclosure.' 
Introduction
While tournaments have received signi…cant attention in personnel economics (Green and Stokey, 1983; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983) , the existing literature has mostly focused on the static tournaments. In these tournaments, the winner is determined by how well the participants perform in a single task. But tournaments are often dynamic in nature (Meyer 1991 (Meyer , 1992 Rosen, 1986) . Moreover, in many dynamic tournaments, the …rm (or the tournament organizer) is often more informed about the workers'(or the contestants') progress compared to what the workers can infer by themselves.
Consider the example of a promotion tournament. In order to be eligible for a promotion, a worker usually spends a certain duration of time in his current position, and his promotion depends on how well he has performed (relative to his peers) in all the tasks he was responsible for. The supervisor of the worker may be better informed about the worker's (and his peers') performance compared to the what the worker might learn by himself. Another example might be the students' performance in a course, where their …nal grades depend on their performance in the midterm as well as in the …nal examination. In such a setting it is also plausible to assume that the course instructor is privately informed about how well each student has performed in each of the two examinations. Because the student is yet to gain expertise over the subject that he is being tested on, it may be di¢ cult for him to assess his own performance in the examination.
The information advantage of the …rm provides it with a unique instrument to a¤ect its workers'e¤ort levels, namely, a strategic information disclosure at the interim stage. When the …rm is privately informed about how well each worker has performed in the intermediate tasks, she has the choice of how much information about the intermediate results to disclose back to the workers. In this context, we ask the following question: What is the optimal disclosure policy when the …rm attempts to maximize the aggregate e¤ort of its workers?
Indeed, the majority of the …rms in the modern labor market adopts some form of performance appraisal and feedback policy to motivate their employees (see Cleveland et al., 1989) . 1 However, how much information the supervisors should disclose to their subordinates is a highly debated question. Some scholars argue for a greater openness in the feedback system claiming that under such a feedback policy the employees will have more trust on the reward system (Hammer, 1975; Lawler, 1987) . Others have argued that too much of disclosure may be counterproductive, because it may damage self-esteem and thereby demotivate the employees (Beer, 1990) . In fact, the organizational behavior and psychology literature has long pointed out that the performance ratings are often imprecise or inaccurate (Landy and Farr, 1980) . And, it has also been noted that the imprecision of ratings may be intentional on the part of the raters and may be a good thing for the organization overall. Murphy and Cleveland (1995) argue that a supervisor who consistently turns in accurate performance appraisals might prove to be ine¤ective in motivating her employees. "This does not mean that inaccuracy in rating is a good thing, but targeted inaccuracy might be a very good thing. Raters who never distort or manipulate performance ratings may be passing up on the use of an important managerial tool" (Murphy and Cleveland (1995) , pp.339-340).
In the context of this debate, our article makes two novel contributions to a nascent but growing literature on optimal interim feedback (Aoyagi, 2008; Ederer, 2008; Gershkov and Perry, 2008; Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2004; Fuchs, 2007; Lizzeri et al., 2002; Yildirim, 2005) . First, we highlight a new trade-o¤ associated with the interim performance disclosure in a tournament: a disclosure policy that enhances post-disclosure work incentives may dampen work incentives in the pre-disclosure stage. While the existing literature has recognized that the …rm's disclosure policy can a¤ect both the pre-and the post-disclosure e¤ort levels in a tournament, it has not fully explored the potential trade-o¤ that may arise between the two. 2 
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Second, we show that in the face of the aforementioned trade-o¤, partial disclosure is strictly optimal. There are several important implications of this …nding. (i) We o¤er a novel justi…cation for the optimality of partial disclosure. Our result provides a theoretical foundation to the "targeted" inaccuracy in feedback documented in the organizational behavior literature (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995) . (ii) Our …ndings also resembles the so called 'grade in ‡ation' in performance appraisal documented by several scholars (Beer, 1990 ; MacLeod, 1 A commonly observed feedback system in many organizations is the so called "360 0 feedback" system. In this system the supervisor gathers information about his employee not only based on his own observation, but also by seeking performance appraisals about the worker from his peers. See Peiperl (2001) for a discussion on the pros and cons of such a system. Also see Murphy (1990 Murphy ( , 1992 ) for a case study on a more traditional feedback system where each manager o¤ers feedback to her employee solely based on her own observation about her employee's performance. 2 This is primarily due to the fact that most these authors (e.g., Aoyagi, 2008; Ederer, 2008; Yildirim, 2005 ) have focused on certain special classes of disclosure policies (to ensure tractability), which are not ‡exible enough to capture the aforementioned trade-o¤ (e.g., considering only the extreme policies of full-and nodisclosure, policies that signals only the 'lead'between the two workers rather than their actual performance, etc.). In contrast, we allow the …rm to choose the optimal policy from a completely general class of policies that captures this trade-o¤, and propose a methodology to keep the …rm's optimization problem tractable. The exact de…nition of a general disclosure policy is discussed later in Section 2. 3 Gershkov and Perry (2008) highlight a similar tradeo¤ in a tournament model where the principal decides how much weight to put on the midterm review, but keeps the disclosure policy …xed. Also, Lizzeri et al. (2002) compare full disclosure to no disclosure in a principal-agent model with interim performance evaluation and …nd that, for certain wage schemes, full disclosure induces higher pre-disclosure e¤ort but lower postdisclosure e¤ort. Our article is perhaps the …rst one to study this tradeo¤ in the context of a tournament where the principal chooses a disclosure policy.
2003; Murphy, 1990 ). While rating their employees' performances, supervisors often give a highly concentrated rating, and often they rate everyone on the higher side (Beer, 1990; MacLeod, 2003) . Our result indicates that such a grade in ‡ation may also arise in a tournament setting where the …rm o¤ers good rating to all agents unless all of them performs poorly. (iii) It is in stark contrast with the existing literature where one of the two 'extreme'policies of 'full-disclosure'and 'no-disclosure'is always optimal (Aoyagi, 2008; Ederer, 2008 ). This literature also shows that the optimal disclosure policy varies drastically with the curvature of the workers'cost function. In contrast, we highlight the fact that optimal disclosure policy can be solely driven by the trade-o¤ between the pre-and post-disclosure e¤ort incentives (rather than by the curvature of the cost function). 4 (iv) Finally, our result indicates that any a priori restrictions on the class of disclosure policies that only allow for the extreme policies (e.g., see Ederer, 2008; Lizzeri et al., 2002; Yildirim, 2005) may imply a loss of generality. The optimal policy can be signi…cantly more nuanced than the extreme policies of full-disclosure and no-disclosure.
We present a simple model, which generalizes the model of Lizzeri et al. (2002) to a tournament setting. There are two workers (ex ante identical) competing in two stages: intermediate and …nal. At each stage, each worker can either succeed or fail. After the intermediate stage, the …rm (but not the workers) privately observes the results and discloses a public signal to the worker that reveals some information about the intermediate results.
After observing the signal, the workers update their beliefs about the intermediate outcome and choose their …nal-stage e¤ort levels. The worker who gets the highest number of successes over the two stages is promoted. The …rm commits to a disclosure policy at the beginning of the game where a disclosure policy maps the interim performances of the workers into a set of signals that the …rm can publicly disclose. In order to focus on the incentive implications of the information disclosure, we assume that the prizes for the winner and the loser in the tournament are exogenously given, and the only channel through which the …rm can in ‡uence the e¤ort incentives is through the strategic disclosure of the intermediate performance. 5 The key result of our paper is that the optimal disclosure policy takes a simple form: the …rm discloses information (without any noise) only if both workers fail at the intermediate stage, and does not disclose any information following any other intermediate outcomes. The intuition behind this result is the following. While choosing the optimal disclosure policy, the …rm faces a trade-o¤ between …nal-stage and intermediate-stage e¤ort: a disclosure policy that enhances the …nal stage e¤ort may dampen the intermediate stage e¤ort incentives. This happens due to the following reason: the …nal stage e¤orts are high when the workers learn that the race is close, because by exerting additional e¤ort, a worker can signi…cantly a¤ect his chances of getting promoted. But e¤ort is costly. If the disclosure policy informs the workers whenever the race is close, workers also have a countervailing incentive to reduce their e¤ort at the intermediate stage in order to avoid a close race at the …nal stage. The disclosure policy "disclose only if both fail" resolves this trade-o¤ optimally. On the one hand, disclosing that both workers have failed at the intermediate stage (and thus are in the same position) stimulates competition at the …nal stage. On the other hand, both workers would not want to …nd themselves in the position where they compete intensively at the …nal stage. So they have incentives to exert e¤ort at the intermediate stage in order to decrease the probability of the outcome where both fail.
To establish this result, we …rst consider the disclosure policies that are symmetric (i.e., immune to any permutation of the workers'names) and deterministic (the feedback depends deterministically on the intermediate results). This class of disclosure policies is not only more realistic, it is also analytically tractable. We then analyze optimal disclosure policy in the class of all feasible disclosure policies (i.e., policies that are not necessarily symmetric or deterministic). But this presents a technical challenge. Because we do not assume any a priori restrictions on the class of disclosure policies that the …rm can choose from, the decision problem for the …rm entails a choice from a class of policies that map the workers' performances to a set of signals that can potentially be in…nitely large. This issue makes the optimization problem apparently intractable. 6 We overcome the tractability problem by showing that without any loss of generality, one can restrict attention to a class of disclosure policies that use no more than six signalsi.e., the number of workers plus the number of all potential outcomes at the intermediate state. This simpli…cation of the set of potential disclosure policies drastically improves the tractability of the optimization problem and, at the least, makes the problem amenable to numerical methods. The numerical optimization result indicate that the partial disclosure policy discussed above remains optimal even if the …rm can choose any general policy.
It is worth noting that the optimality of partial disclosure result is similar in spirit with the …ndings of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004) and Fuchs (2007) . Dubey and Geanakoplos consider a tournament where a participant's payo¤ is directly determined by his rank among the contestants. They show that a coarse feedback that pools agents with similar performances (e.g., letter grades in an examination) may generate better incentives than full disclosure. In contrast, Fuchs considers a dynamic principal-agent model where the principal is privately informed about the agent's performance. He shows that it may be optimal for the …rm not to o¤er any feedback unless the worker's performance falls below a threshold, at which point, the worker is …red. However, since these authors study the optimal feedback in contexts that are di¤erent from ours, their …ndings are also driven by the e¤ects that are completely di¤erent from the ones we highlight here. This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal e¤ort choice given any disclosure policy. Section 4 analyzes the optimal choice of a disclosure policy and section 5 concludes.
2. The Model players and technology: A …rm (principal) F hires two workers (agents) A and B. The job must be completed in two periods (or stages), intermediate and …nal. The production technology in each of the two periods is identical. In each of the two periods, both workers simultaneously choose how much e¤ort to exert, and the outcome of each worker's e¤ort in each period can either be a success (s) or a failure (f ), depending on the level of e¤ort exerted by him.
The two workers compete for a promotion that depends on their performance in their current job. The …rm aggregates the number of success and failures of each worker over the two periods, and the worker who gets the most number of successes is promoted; if the number of successes is equal across workers, the tie is resolved in favour of either worker with equal probability.
At the intermediate period, worker i (i 2 fA; Bg) exerts e¤ort e i 2 [0; 1] at the cost c (e i ) = e 2 i =2 and produces the intermediate outcome y i 2 fs; f g, where
The workers do not observe the outcome of the intermediate period (own outcome as well as the outcome of the other worker), but the …rm observes the outcome for both workers perfectly. That is, F observes an element of the set Y = f(s; s) ; (s; f ) ; (f; s) ; (f; f )g ; where, for example, (s; f ) corresponds to worker A succeeding and worker B failing at the intermediate stage. F , however, can disclose some (potentially noisy) information to the workers at the beginning of the …nal period. We will elaborate on the disclosure policy shortly. At the beginning of the …nal period, both workers observe the disclosed information. Both workers exert the …nal period e¤ort E i 2 [0; 1] at the cost of c (E i ) = E 2 i =2 and produces the …nal period outcome Y i 2 fs; f g, where
We also assume that the levels of e¤ort in both periods are unobserved, giving rise to a moral hazard problem. The outcomes for the two workers in both periods are assumed to be statistically independent of each other.
Incentives:
In order to focus on the incentive implications of the information feedback, we assume that the rewards of the winner and the loser of the promotion tournament are exogenously …xed. The worker who "wins" the tournament (by scoring the most number of successes over the two periods) gets promoted and earns an exogenously speci…ed reward (or, wage associated o¤ered in the new job) equal to 1, while the other worker (the one with the lower number of successes among the two) "loses"the tournament and earns 0. If the number of successes is equal for the two workers, they have equal probability of being promoted.
Even thought the …rm cannot manipulate the rewards for the winner and the loser of the tournament, she can sharpen the incentives of the workers by strategically disclosing the information about the intermediate period outcome to the workers. The information about the intermediate outcome can a¤ect how much e¤ort the workers exert at the …nal period, and therefore, their equilibrium behavior at the intermediate period as well. The information disclosure mechanism is de…ned as follows.
Disclosure policy: At the beginning of the game, F commits to a disclosure policy (Z; ) that maps the intermediate outcome of both workers, (y A ; y B ), into a set of signals Z according to the function : Y ! Z, where Z is the set of probability distributions on Z. In other words, at the end of the intermediate stage, F observes (y A ; y B ) and sends a public signal z 2 Z that is chosen according to the probability measure (z j y A ; y B ). For brevity of notation, in what follows, we will denote the probability distribution function of (z j y A ; y B ) as y A y B (z).
Note that the disclosure policy de…ned above is completely general in its form. As special cases, it includes no disclosure (the …rm sends the same signal regardless of the realized outcome), full disclosure (there is a one-to-one correspondence between intermediate outcomes and the signals that are disclosed following these outcomes), and all other deterministic disclosure policies (such that the probability distributions y A y B (z) are degenerate), but it also allows the …rm to introduce some noise to her report by randomizing over multiple signals using a prespeci…ed probability distribution.
Payoffs: We assume that both the workers as well as the …rm are risk neutral. Let e = (e A ; e B ) and E (z) = (E A (z); E B (z)). The expected payo¤ of worker i is
where the expressions for Pr(i wins j e; fE (z)g z2Z ) and Pr(tiej e; fE (z)g z2Z ) can be found in the appendix. That is, the payo¤ of a worker is simply equal to the expected reward he earns at the end of the tournament net of his expected cost of e¤ort in both stages of the tournament. The …rm only cares about the total e¤ort that the two workers exert over the two stages of the tournament. So her payo¤ is given by 7 e A + e B + X (y A ;y B )2Y
Pr(y A ; y B j e)
Time Line. The timing in the stage game is as follows. Strategies and equilibrium concept: The strategy of F is to choose a disclosure policy (Z; ), while the workers' strategy has two elements: a choice of intermediate e¤ort level, e i , and a choice of …nal e¤ort level given the realized signal, E i (z). We use BayesianNash equilibrium as a solution concept.
In the following section we characterize the optimal e¤ort by the workers for a given disclosure policy. This is a key step toward the characterization of the optimal disclosure policy.
Optimal Effort
Because a disclosure policy a¤ects both pre-and post-disclosure e¤ort incentives of the workers, we solve for the optimal e¤ort for a given disclosure policy working from the end of the game. Given a disclosed signal z (under a given disclosure policy (Z; )), worker i's choice of the …nal stage e¤ort, E i (z), maximizes his probability of winning the tournament (conditional on the realized signal) net of the cost of …nal stage e¤ort. That is,
Pr(i wins jÊ i ; E j ; e; z) + 1 2 Pr(tie jÊ i ; E j ; e; z) 1 2Ê
2 i
7 One can interpret this formulation of the …rm's payo¤ in either one of the following two ways: (i) The …rm's pro…t is deterministically governed by the level of e¤ort put in by the two agents, where the outcome of each stage fs; f g is simply a signal of the workers'e¤ort and does not a¤ect the …rm's bottom line by itself.
(ii) The …rm earns …xed payo¤s from each success and failure by the two agents over the two periods, and simply maximizes its expected payo¤.
where the expression for Pr(i wins jÊ i ; E j ; e; z) and Pr(tie jÊ i ; E j ; e; z) can be found in the appendix. Thus, if an interior solution exists, the optimal …nal stage e¤ort for both workers after a signal z 2 Z is given by the solution of the …rst-order conditions 8 :
Let the solution to the above pair of equations be denoted as E (z) = fE A (z) ; E B (z)g z2Z . Next, we characterize the intermediate stage e¤ort for the two workers. The intermediate stage e¤ort choice of worker i, e i , maximizes his payo¤ given the disclosure policy and the …nal stage e¤ort choices of the two workers, E (z). That is,
where the expressions for P r (i wins j E ;ê i ; e j ) and P r (tie j E ;ê i ; e j ) are in the Appendix. Thus the optimal intermediate stage e¤ort for both workers must satisfy the …rst-order conditions associated with above maximization problem. Because the maximand in equation (??) depends on the …nal e¤ort choice E (z), the associated …rst-order conditions with respect to e A and e B can be written as:
(3) e A = e A (e B ; E ) ; e B = e B (e A ; E ) :
Let the solution to the above pair of equations be denoted as e = (e A ; e B ).
The following lemma shows that for any given disclosure policy, the intermediate and …nal e¤ort choices given by equations (2) and (3) constitute an equilibrium of the tournament game played by the two workers. Lemma 1. Given any disclosure policy (Z; ) ; there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game played by the two workers that is induced by (Z; ), and the equilibrium levels of e¤ ort solve (2) and (3). Equations (2) and (3) have a unique solution, where the e¤ ort levels in both periods lie strictly between 0 and 1.
Thus the optimal disclosure policy of the …rm is the one that maximizes the expected aggregate e¤ort of the two workers subject to (2) and (3). The next sections deals with this problem.
Optimal Disclosure Policy
The problem for the …rm is to choose a disclosure policy (Z; ) that maximizes the expected aggregate e¤ort of the two workers over the two periods subject to the constraint that any disclosure policy induces a pro…le of e¤ort levels as given by the equations (2) and (3) as a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the game played by the two workers. Thus, F solves the following problem:
Bg is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game induced by (Z; )
is a probability measure on Z 8 (y A ; y B ) 2 Y:
The key technical challenge in solving the above program, P, is that the set of feasible disclosure policies (Z; ) is arbitrarily large because Z can be any arbitrarily (potentially in…nitely) large set of signals. The …rm can observe only four events after the intermediate stage, so if we assume that the …rm cannot randomize, we can restrict attention to disclosure policies with at most four signals. However, the …rm might want to add some noise to the signal she sends, and if she is allowed to do that, she might want to choose a stochastic disclosure policy that puts positive probability on more than four signals. Moreover, if the …rm is allowed to randomize, it is not a priori obvious that we can restrict attention to disclosure policies with a …nite number of signals. 9 Given this technical challenge, we proceed in two steps: First, we restrict attention to a special class of disclosure policies, namely, symmetric and deterministic policies. Intuitively, a symmetric and deterministic disclosure policy is one that is invariant to any permutation of the workers'identities, and maps each intermediate period outcome into a unique signal. Under these policies, it is relatively straightforward to show that the cardinality of the set of signals does not pose any problem.
Second, we con…rm that the optimal disclosure policy in the class of symmetric and deterministic policies in indeed optimal in the general class of policies. To do so, we …rst show that without any loss of generality, one can bound the cardinality of Z such that the problem becomes tractable, at least by numerical methods.
4.1.
Symmetric and deterministic disclosure policies. A disclosure policy (Z; ) is said to be deterministic if for all (y A ; y B ) 2 Y; the disclosure policy reveals a unique signal that corresponds to the outcome (y A ; y B ). That is, for all (y A ; y B ) 2 Y; there exists a signal z 2 Z such that y A ;y B (z) = 1. A disclosure policy is said to be symmetric if for any signal z 2 Z there exists another signal z 0 2 Z (potentially, but not necessarily distinct from z) such that (z j y A ; y B ) = (z 0 j y B ; y A ) for all y A 2 fs; f g and y B 2 fs; f g. 10 Intuitively, a symmetric disclosure policy treats the workers symmetrically ex ante: the "noise" in the 9 For instance, consider the following disclosure policy: if both agents succeed or both fail at the intermediate stage, the signal is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 1; if only agent A succeeds, the signal is distributed normally with mean 1 and variance 1; if only agent B succeeds, the mean is -1 and the variance 1. This disclosure policy uses a continuum of signals, and the resulting distribution of …nal e¤ort levels cannot be replicated by any …nite disclosure policy. It is not immediately obvious that this type of policy, or any other policy with an in…nite number of signals, can be excluded from consideration. 10 It is important to allow for the possibility that z 0 can be distinct from z, because requiring z 0 = z would rule out some interesting disclosure policies (e.g., full disclosure). disclosed information depends only on the relative performances of the two workers, and not on the workers'individual identities.
Apart from facilitating analytical tractability, there are two additional reasons for focusing on this class of policies: First, it is more realistic -it is perhaps more di¢ cult for the …rm to commit to a randomization mechanism over the signals. Also, symmetry implies that the …rm is not biased towards any particular worker while choosing the amount of information to disclose to her at the interim stage. Second, it allows us to present a succinct analytical exposition of the trade-o¤ between the e¤ort levels in the two periods, and highlight the intuition behind the main result of the paper -the optimality of partial disclosure.
There are only seven policies in this class: (i) Full disclosure, (ii) no disclosure, (iii) disclosing only if both succeed, (iv) disclosing only if both fail, (v) disclosing whether the score is the same or not, (vi) disclosing whether the scores are the same, and if they are the same, whether both succeed or fail, and …nally, (vii) disclosing who is the leader if the scores are di¤erent. The optimal disclosure policy is simply the one that induces the maximal expected aggregate e¤ort over the two periods. Comparison of these policies leads to the following proposition: Proposition 1. The optimal disclosure policy in the class of symmetric deterministic disclosure policies is to "disclose only if both fail." That is, the optimal disclosure policy is:
Proposition 1 suggests that the optimal disclosure policy uses two signals: one signal (namely, z 1 ) is revealed if both workers fail in the intermediate stage, and the other signal (namely, z 2 ) is revealed for all other performance realizations at the intermediate stage.
To understand the intuition behind this result, …rst note that the …rm faces a trade-o¤ between the intermediate and the …nal stage e¤ort incentives: the policy that induces the high intermediate e¤ort leads to lower e¤ort at the …nal stage.
11 This is due to the fact that policies that may lead to intense competition at the …nal stage creates a countervailing incentive for the workers to avoid such intense competition (because e¤ort is costly) by lowering their intermediate stage e¤ort level. The argument is as follows: in the …nal stage, the workers exert high e¤ort (equal to 1/2) if they know for sure that both of them are at the same position after the intermediate stage. 12 In contrast, when they know for sure that one of the workers leads after the intermediate stage, both the leader and the follower have less incentive to exert e¤ort at the …nal stage (the leader's e¤ort equals 2/5, and the follower's 1/5). In this case, the marginal bene…t of …nal stage e¤ort (that is, the marginal increase in the winning probability) is smaller both for the leader and the follower compared to the case where the race is tied at the intermediate stage. However, the workers'choice of …nal stage e¤ort also impacts their intermediate-stage e¤ort choice. At the intermediate stage, a worker takes into account the e¤ect of his e¤ort on the probabilities of reaching di¤erent intermediate outcomes. In particular, suppose that increasing the intermediate-stage e¤ort will increase the probability of an intermediate outcome that leads to intensive competition at the …nal stage. If this is the case, the worker has less incentives to exert e¤ort at the intermediate stage. 11 In fact, the ranking of the disclosure policies with respect to …nal and intermediate e¤ort are almost the reverse of each other (with the policy of full disclosure as an exception). 12 This is a common feature of patent race games (e.g. Fudenberg et al.,1983; and Harris and Vickers, 1987) and tournament models (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981; and Rosen, 1986 ).
The policy "disclose only if both fail" achieves the optimal balance between intermediate and …nal e¤ort incentives. On the one hand, the policy includes a signal (namely, z 1 ) that creates intensive …nal-stage competition. On the other hand, the probability of this signal decreases in intermediate-stage e¤ort, so the workers have incentives to exert high e¤ort in the intermediate stage in order to avoid competing …ercely at the …nal stage.
This reasoning also suggests why the policy "disclose only if both succeed," which seems symmetric to "disclose only if both fail," cannot be optimal. The policy "disclose only if both succeed" sends a signal that leads to intensive …nal-stage competition only when both workers succeed at the intermediate stage. Because e¤ort is costly, the workers would prefer to avoid such a signal. This e¤ect dampens incentives to exert e¤ort at the intermediate stage, because intermediate e¤ort increases the likelihood that both workers will succeed in the intermediate period. 13 It turns out that the policy "disclose only if both fail"remains optimal even if one considers the general class of policies. But before we discuss such generalization, it is important to highlight the key implications of this optimal policy. 4.1.1. Implications of the optimal disclosure policy. The optimal disclosure policy "disclose only if both fail" has several important implications. First, it o¤ers a novel justi…cation for partial disclosure in performance feedback. It suggests that the …rm should reveal the truth only if both workers fail, but must pool all other outcomes. As we had discussed in the Introduction, several authors in the organizational behavior literature has noted that performance appraisals and feedbacks are often imprecise (Landy and Farr, 1980) . Feedbacks "may include motivated distortion intended to improve the usefulness of the performance appraisal"and "targeted"inaccuracy in the interim feedbacks can in fact strengthen the work incentives (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995, p. 29). Our result o¤ers a theoretical justi…cation behind this observation.
Second, the optimal policy is similar in spirit with the so-called 'grade in ‡ation' in the performance feedback. In hierarchical organizations, it is often noted that while rating the performance of their subordinates, supervisors often tend to rate everyone on the higher side (Beer, 1990; MacLeod, 2003; Murphy, 1990) . It is argued that such grade in ‡ation stems from the fact that supervisors face a substantial risk of straining their relationship with their subordinates if they provide harsh feedback (Beer, 1990; MacLeod, 2003) . Our result suggests that grade in ‡ation can also occur in a tournament where participants always get a good feedback unless all of them perform poorly. However, rather than from the risk of 'straining relationship,' such in ‡ation arises as a best response of the …rm to balance the trade-o¤ between pre-and post-disclosure e¤ort incentives.
Third, this result is in sharp contrast with the existing literature that recommends 'extreme'disclosure policies of 'full disclosure'or 'no disclosure' (Aoyagi, 2008) . Therefore, it is important to draw out the factors that lead to this di¤erence in …ndings. Aoyagi investigates the optimal disclosure policy in a model that makes the following key assumptions which are absent in our model: (i) A continuum of possible realizations of output at each stage. 14 (ii) At each stage the …rm can observe only the di¤erence between the individual outputs and 13 The policy "disclose whether the score is the same"is suboptimal for a similar reason. At the …nal stage, the workers compete intensively after they get the signal that their score is the same. So, this policy induces high e¤ort at the …nal stage. However, at the intermediate stage, an increase in e¤ort increases the probability of the outcome where both succeed, so it leads to a higher probability of intensive competition at the …nal stage. For that reason, this policy is dominated by "disclose only if both fail" in terms of total e¤ort, even though it generates higher e¤ort at the …nal stage.
14 Note that our model is not a special case of Aoyagi (2008) , because he assumes a continuous distribution over output levels.
not their levels. 15 (iii) The probability density function of the di¤erence in outputs at each stage is linear in the di¤erence in e¤orts at that stage.
Aoyagi …nds that the optimal disclosure policy is highly sensitive to the curvature of the workers'marginal cost of e¤ort. If the marginal cost is convex, full disclosure is optimal in the class of all disclosure policies that have a symmetric equilibrium. If the marginal cost is concave, no disclosure is optimal, and if the cost function is quadratic (as it is assumed in our model), all disclosure policies induce the same expected e¤ort.
In contrast, in our model, e¤ort a¤ects the outcome distribution in a non-linear fashion. Moreover, the …rm observes the intermediate-stage output of each worker and not just the di¤erence between them. Thus, Aoyagi's …ndings do not apply to our setting. Moreover, in contrast with Aoyagi (and also Ederer, 2008) , we show that the disclosure policy of the …rm does have a signi…cant impact on the …rm's payo¤ even when the workers' cost function is quadratic. In addition, the optimal policy does not drastically change with the curvature of the workers' cost function. 16 This is perhaps a desirable feature of the policy from the managerial implementation point of view, because ascertaining the curvature of workers' marginal cost can be di¢ cult, if at all feasible.
Finally, our result suggests that conditioning the disclosure policy only on the di¤erence between the workers'outputs (Aoyagi, 2008; Ederer, 2008 , Yildirim, 2005 and/or imposing an a priori restriction by considering only the extreme policies of 'full disclosure' or 'no disclosure' (Ederer, 2008; Lizzeri, et al., 2002 ) may imply considerable loss of generality. The …rm can be strictly better o¤ by committing to a partial disclosure policy that is signi…cant more nuanced.
In the following subsection, we extend our analysis to include all feasible disclosure policies (not only symmetric and deterministic) and search for the optimal policy.
4.2.
General disclosure policies. It is not obvious that the restriction to the class of symmetric and deterministic disclosure policy is without loss of generality. For example, it is not clear at the outset whether it is optimal for the …rm to treat the workers the same way or to choose an asymmetric disclosure policy that favors one worker over another. An asymmetric policy may induce an asymmetric equilibrium where one worker exerts much higher e¤ort compared to the other worker, but the total e¤ort is higher than with any symmetric policy. However, as we discuss below, the policy "disclose only if both fail" remains optimal even if the general class of disclosure policies are allowed.
But in order to show this, we need to ensure that the general problem P is amenable to the standard optimization tools. As a …rst step, this requires bounding the cardinality of the space of signals Z without any loss of generality. The following proposition is useful to overcome this problem. Proposition 2. Suppose there are n agents and k possible outcomes of the tournament at the intermediate stage. Then, if an optimal disclosure policy exists, then there exists an optimal disclosure policy where jZj n + k: 15 In our model, that would translate into the assumption that the principal cannot distinguish between both agents succeeding and both failing. 16 This observation follows from the fact that if one considers a more general cost function of the form e = , the …rm's pro…t under any disclosure policy remains a continuous function of : Thus, the optimal disclosure policy for a given = 2 (which is the case in our model) remains optimal even if varies within a neighborhood of 2. This observation also suggests assumption of quadratic cost function is not a key driver of our result.
Proposition 2 asserts that, in our model with two workers and four intermediate outcomes (fs; sg ; fs; f g ; ff; sg ; ff; f g), without any loss of generality, one can indeed restrict attention to a class of disclosure policies that maps the workers'performances into a set of signals that contains at most six elements. Proposition 2 has two key implications: …rst, it shows that the set of signals Z can be taken to be a …nite set without any loss of generality. Second, the cardinality of the set of signals can be bounded from above so that the solution to the program P is tractable.
But before we discuss the solution to P, it is important to understand the intuition behind the above proposition. Note that the only way the disclosure policy enters both the objective function and the constraints in the …rm's problem P is through the expected value of the workers'e¤ort level. However, if a probability distribution on some set has a certain expected value, it is possible to …nd another probability distribution on this set with the same expected value that assigns positive probabilities only to a …nite number of mass points. Thus, we can restrict Z to be a …nite set without any loss of generality. But one can further bound the cardinality of the set Z. Suppose the optimal disclosure policy is (Z ; ) and implements a pro…le of e¤ort levels fe ; E g. If so, then (Z ; ) must also be a solution to an auxiliary problem of maximizing the …rm's payo¤ by choosing a disclosure policy among the class of policies that implements fe ; E g. Such an auxiliary problem can be formulated as a linear programming problem with n + k equality constraints. 17 The bound on Z follows from determining the maximum number of choice variables in this problem that can take nonzero values at a corner solution.
In what follows, we restrict attention without loss of generality to the class of policies that use at most six signals (by Proposition 2), and elaborate on the constraints presented in the general program P.
18 Let Z = f1; 2; :::; 6g. Trivially, the constraint that must be a probability density on Z for all (y A ; y B ) 2 Y, implies that the following conditions must be met: The other constraint, i.e., fe i ; E i (z)g i2fA;Bg must be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game induced by (Z; ), can also be represented by a set of equations. Recall that fe i ; E i (z)g is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if it solves the …rst-order conditions (2) and (3). Therefore, the …rm's problem can now be written as: Pr (y A ; y B je A ; e B )
s:t: (2) , (3) , and (4) .
While Proposition 2 allows us to reduce the …rm's problem to a tractable for as given by P 0 , we still cannot apply the analytical optimization methods for …nding the global maximum. This is due to the fact that the objective function is not concave in its arguments (after 17 There are n constraints to ensure that each worker's intermediate stage e¤ort choice is a best response to other workers' choice, and k constraints to ensure that following each of the intermediate outcomes, the probability distribution on Z induced by the disclosure policy is well de…ned (i.e., probabilities sum up to one). 18 Any disclosure policy with less than six signals can be represented as one with six signals, some of which have probability zero. plugging in the expressions for E i s using (2), and writing the objective function as a function of (e A ; e B ; f (z)g 6 z=1 )). Thus, even if one can apply the standard optimization techniques to solve P 0 , it need not be the case that the solution obtained is a global maximum. Confronting this issue, we solve the program by numerical methods. Plugging in the expressions for E i s, the optimization problem boils down to a problem of choosing twenty six variables (two intermediate e¤ort levels (e A ; e B ), and twenty four probability values representing four probability distributions, each corresponding to a particular realization of (y A ; y B ), on the set of signals which has cardinality of six (i.e., f ss (z) ; f s (z) ; sf (z) ; f f (z)g 6 z=1 )), that maximizes the expected aggregate e¤ort level subject to the constraints that the intermediate e¤ort levels satisfy (3) and the s satisfy condition (4). The highest total e¤ort under any disclosure policy (numerical optimization result) turned out to be equal to 1.6178. Moreover, the highest total e¤ort under optimal symmetric deterministic policy is equal to 1.6211. The fact that the two values do not exactly match is due to the numerical nature of the reported solution to P 0 . 19 This observation suggests that the policy "disclose only if both fail" is indeed optimal even in the most general class of disclosure policies.
We further check for the robustness of this result by considering the following variations to the model. Let the production technologies in the intermediate and the …nal stages be Pr (y i = s) = e i and Pr (Y i = s) = E i , where 2 (0; 1] is a parameter that re ‡ects the sensitivity of outcome with respect to the e¤ort level. We keep all other aspects of the model unchanged. Note that we arrive at the original model by setting = 1. For di¤erent values of , we obtain the …rm's payo¤ associated with the numerical solution of the optimization problem P 0 and compare it with the payo¤ associated with the disclosure policy "disclose only if both fail." Table 1 summarizes the results.
For di¤erent values of , Table 1 shows the highest e¤ort obtained by any symmetric deterministic disclosure policy (second column), and the highest total e¤ort obtained from 19 Since the Matlab optimization routine we have used requires that the initial conditions must be feasible, it is not possible to use equation (3) as an equality constraint (it is rarely possible to draw a tuple (eA; eB) at random that satis…es (3)). Instead, a measure of the "error" due to not exactly satisfying constraint (3) is incorporated as a "penalty term" in the objective function. With this modi…cation, the optimization routine can start with an arbitrary (eA; eB) value but converges at a point that "almost"satis…es the equality constraint. More precisely, in order to solve minx f (x) such that g (x) = c, (where c is a scalar) we rewrite the problem as a "augmented" problem minx f (x) + (g (x) c) 2 , where is a positive real number. The term (g (x) c) 2 represents the "penalty" for not satisfying the equality constraint. This is always positive by construction, so the solution to the "augmented" problem must su¢ ciently minimize this penalty. Therefore, a solution to "augmented" problem is a reasonable approximation of the solution to the original problem for a suitably chosen . We have used = 1000 for all equality constraints in our program. The outcome of numerical optimization turned out to be highly dependent on the initial condition, so 100 simulations were performed, with initial values of these 26 variables drawn as a 26 1 vector from a uniform distribution in
solving problem P 0 numerically (third column). The two columns are almost identical with negligible di¤erences stemming from the numerical nature of the solution as discussed above. Comparing the two columns, it is evident that the policy "disclose only if both fail"remains optimal even if one perturbs the model by varying the production technology through the parameter . This …nding suggests that the insight o¤ered by Proposition 1 continues to hold even if a general class of disclosure policy is available to the …rm. Moreover, it is robust to variations in the sensitivity of the outcome in the two periods with respect to the workers' e¤ort levels.
Conclusion
This paper o¤ers a stylized model of dynamic tournament where workers compete through multiple periods. When the …rm privately observes the workers'performances in each stage of the tournament, how much information should the …rm reveal to the workers at the interim stage in order to maximize their e¤ort incentives? We argue that the optimal disclosure policy must balance the following trade-o¤: the disclosure policy that motivates the workers to exert high e¤ort at the …nal stage also dampens the incentives at the intermediate stage.
The optimal disclosure policy takes a simple form: the …rm reveals information (without any noise) only if both workers do poorly at the intermediate stage, and does not reveal any information otherwise. An interesting implication of this result is that it provides a novel justi…cation for the optimality of partial disclosure -a well-documented feature of interim feedback in hierarchical organizations. This result is also in sharp contrast with the existing literature that advocates for the 'extreme'policies of 'full disclosure'and 'no disclosure. ' The key contribution of this paper is to highlight the trade-o¤ between the pre-and postdisclosure e¤ort incentives that leads the …rm to …lter the performance feedback it o¤ers to its employees. But …rms o¤er performance feedback for several reasons and enhancing work incentives is just one of them. For example, based on the feedback, a worker can identify skills that he needs to develop, and consequently, can undertake e¢ cient investments in human capital (Beer, 1987) . Furthermore, one can also consider a more general setting where the …rm can choose both the reward structure as well as the degree of interim feedback. How would any of these issues in ‡uence the optimal disclosure policy can be an interesting question for the future research. However, the trade-o¤ between pre-and post-disclosure incentives still continue to play a signi…cant role in governing the …rm's disclosure policy.
Appendix
Before we present the proofs omitted in the text, it is useful to elaborate on the algebraic expressions for the …rst-order conditions of the agents, as they will be frequently used in the proofs.
The probability that worker i wins conditional on the e¤ort levels in both periods is
; where = s if i = A and f otherwise, and = s if i = B and f otherwise. The probability of a tie is Pr(tie j e A ; e B ; (E A (z);
Therefore, the …rst-order conditions ( For every z 2 Z, let P y A y B (z) = Pr (y A ; y B j z) be the posterior probability of intermediate outcome (y A ; y B ) conditional on signal z being observed. That is, P ss (z) = ss (z)e A e B ss (z)e A e B + sf (z)e A (1 e B ) + f s (z)(1 e A )e B + f f (z)(1 e A )(1 e B ) and P sf (z); P f s (z) and P f f (z) are de…ned similarly. Without loss of generality, we will consider only those signals for which these probabilities are well-de…ned. Then the probability that worker i wins conditional on observing signal z 2 Z and the e¤ort levels is Pr (i winsjE i ; E j ; e A ; e B ; z)
and the probability of a tie conditional on observing signal z 2 Z and the e¤ort levels is Pr (tiejE i ; E j ; e A ; e B ; z) = P ss (z)(
where = s if i = A and f otherwise; = s if i = B and f otherwise. Consequently, the …rst-order conditions for the …nal stage e¤ort are:
where
If (F inal) has an interior solution, then it is given by (5)
Therefore, the …rm's problem P 0 can now be written as:
max e A ;e B ;f (z)g z2Z e A + e B + P
, and 8 i; j 2 fs; f g ,
We now present the proofs omitted in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. We present the proof in the following steps.
Step 1. First, we prove that 0 < E i (z) < 1 for any z 2 Z, where E i (z) are de…ned by (F inal). It follows immediately from the de…nitions of
, so the …nal e¤ort levels are given by E i (z) = F i (E i (z); E j (z); z). So the best-response functions at the …nal stage are linear, and if they intersect, the intersection is unique, de…ning unique equilibrium …nal-stage e¤ort levels for each signal realization. Let us now prove that the best-response functions intersect in [0; 1], i.e. for any z 2 Z;
and similarly for E B (z). Note that
Recall that P y A y B is a probability distribution over the set Y: Thus, for all (y A ; y B ), P y A y B 2 [0; 1], and P P y A y B = 1: So, each of the following terms, P ss (z) + P f s (z) + P f f (z), P sf (z) P f s (z), and P ss (z) + P sf (z) + P f f (z) are bounded above by 1. Setting each of these three terms to 1; we obtain E A (z) 3=4. Further, note that
It can be easily checked that the expression above is minimized by P sf (z) = under the constraints P sf (z) 2 [0; 1], P f s (z) 2 [0; 1] and P sf (z) + P f s (z)
1. For these values of P sf (z) and P f s (z) the numerator of the expression for E A (z) equals 7=16. The denominator of the expression for E A (z) is maximized by P sf (z) = 1; P f s (z) = 0 under the same constraints, and its maximal value equals 10=4. Hence, E A (z) 7=16 4=10 = 7=40 > 0. By similar argument, 7=40 E B (z) 3=4, 8z 2 Z.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is given in the following steps:
Step 1. Observe the following:
(a) Policy (v) ("disclosing whether the score is the same or not") generates the same payo¤ for the …rm as policy (vi) ("disclosing whether the score is the same, and if it is the same, whether both succeed or fail"). This is because a signal z such that ss (z) = f f (z) = 1; f s (z) = sf (z) = 0 leads to the same …nal-stage e¤ort as a signal z 0 such that ss (z 0 ) = 1; f f (z 0 ) = sf (z 0 ) = f s (z 0 ) = 0, or a signal z 00 such that f f (z 00 ) = 1; ss (z 00 ) = sf (z 00 ) = f s (z 00 ) = 0 (namely, the …nal-stage e¤ort is 1=2 for both participants following any of these signals). Consequently, policy (v) generates the same …nal-stage e¤orts as policy (vi), and thus, also the lead to the same intermediate-stage e¤orts. In words, it does not matter whether only to disclose that the score is even, or to disclose the actual value of the score, given that it is even.
(b) policy (i) ("no disclosure") generates the same payo¤ for the …rm as policy (vii) ("disclosing who is the leader if the score is not the same"). The argument is the same as above.
Step 2. Given this observation, we e¤ectively have only …ve di¤erent cases. We compute the …rm's payo¤ in each of these …ve cases as follows:
(i) Full disclosure: Z = fz ss ; z sf ; z f s ; z f f g ; y A y B (z y A y B ) = 1.
, and E A (z f s ) = E B (z sf ) = 1=5. Plugging these values into (Int), we solve for the intermediate stage e¤ort level as e A = e B = 89=230 0:38696. Using the equilibrium value of e i , we obtain E (E A (z) + E B (z)) = 0:81022. Thus the expected total e¤ort is 2e A + E (E A (z) + E B (z)) 1:5841.
(ii) No disclosure: Z = fzg ; y A y B (z) = 1. With no disclosure, the two periods are symmetric, so e A = e B = E A = E B = e. Substituting into (F inal) and solving for e yields e = (3 p 5)=2. Thus, the total e¤ort is 4e = 2(3 p 5) 1:5279.
(iii) Disclosing only if both succeed:
At the …nal stage, the e¤ort after signal z 1 is E A (z 1 ) = E B (z 1 ) = 1=2. After signal z 2 ; in a symmetric equilibrium the posteriors are P ss (z 2 ) = 0; P sf (z 2 ) = P f s (z 2 ) = e (1 e) = 1 e 2 ; and P f f (z 2 ) = (1 e)
Substituting for E A (z 2 ) ; we arrive at 9e 3 A + 14e 2 A + 2e A 3 = 0. The only solution that lies in [0; 1] is e 0:3629 (we can check that this solution for e satis…es the second-order conditions). Thus, the expected …nal-stage e¤ort is E (E A (z) + E B (z)) = 1 e+e 2 0:7688. The resulting total e¤ort is 2e + E (E A (z) + E B (z)) 1:4946.
(iv) Disclosing only if both fail: Z = fz 1 ; z 2 g ; f f (z 1 ) = 1; sf (z 2 ) = f s (z 2 ) = ss (z 2 ) = 1.
At the …nal stage, the e¤ort after signal z 1 is E A (z 1 ) = E B (z 1 ) = 1=2. After signal z 2 ; in a symmetric equilibrium the posteriors are P f f (z 2 ) = 0, P sf (z 2 ) = P f s (z 2 ) = e (1 e) =(1 (1 e) 2 ), P ss (z 2 ) = e 2 =(1 (1 e) 2 ). So E A (z 2 ) = E B (z 2 ) = 1=2 (2 e). At the intermediate stage,
Substituting for E A (z 2 ) and reorganizing yields 9e 3 41e 2 + 53e 16 = 0. The only solution that lies in [0; 1] is e 0:4333 (we can check that this solution for e satis…es the second-order conditions). Thus, the expected …nal-stage e¤ort is E (E A (z) + E B (z)) = 1 e+e 2 0:7544. The resulting total e¤ort is 2e + E (E A (z) + E B (z)) 1:6211.
(v) Disclosing whether the score is even:
After signal z 1 ; in a symmetric equilibrium the posteriors are P f f (z 1 ) = (1 e) 2 =(e 2 + (1 e) 2 ), P ss (z 1 ) = e 2 =(e 2 + (1 e) 2 ), P sf (z 1 ) = P f s (z 1 ) = 0: The …nal-stage e¤orts after signal z 1 are E A (z 1 ) = E B (z 1 ) = 1=2. After signal z 2 , in a symmetric equilibrium the posteriors are P f f (z 2 ) = P ss (z 2 ) = 0; and P sf (z 2 ) = P f s (z 2 ) = 1=2. The …nal-stage e¤orts after signal z 2 are E A (z 2 ) = E B (z 2 ) = 1=4. Plugging the values of E A s and E B s into (Int), we can solve for e 0:421 05. Thus, the expected …nal stage e¤ort is E (E A (z) + E B (z)) 0:7562, and the resulting total e¤ort is 2e + E (E A (z) + E B (z)) 1:598.
Thus, the highest total e¤ort is obtained under the policy "disclosing only if both fail."
Proof of Proposition 2. We will present the proof in the context of a model with n players and k possible intermediate outcomes, y 2 fy 1 ; :::; y k g. The proof is given in the following steps:
Step 1. For an arbitrary disclosure policy (Z; ), consider the following subsets of the set of signals Z: and y i (z) ; P y i+1 (z) ; :::; P y k (z) , where P y j (z) = P r(y j jz). In fact, for any j = i + 1; :::; k,
; where M ji (z) = P y j (z)P r(y i je 1 ; :::; e n ) P y i (z)P r(y j je 1 ; :::; e n ) = P y j (z)P r(y i je 1 ; :::; e n )
(1 P k =i+1 P y`( z))P r(y j je 1 ; :::; e n )
; and P r(y i je 1 ; :::; e n ) is the probability of outcome y i conditional on the intermediate e¤ort levels e 1 ; :::; e n . Note that M ji depend only on P y j (z) for j = i + 1; :::; k and e 1 ; :::; e n . So for z 2 Z i the …rm can maximize with respect to y i (z) ; P y i+1 (z) ; :::; P y k (z) instead of n
So the …rm can change the choice variables from (Z; ) to n Z; y i (z) ; P y i+1 (z) ; :::; P y k (z) z2Z i ;i=1;:::;k 1 ; y k (z) z2Z k o and add the constraints that P y i (z) 0 and P k i=1 P y i (z) = 1.
Step 3. We claim the following: let Z ; n y i (z) ; P y i+1 (z) ; :::; P y k (z) o z2Z i ;i=1;:::;k 1
; y k (z) z2Z k and fe i ; E i (z)g i=1;:::;n be an equilibrium, where Z can be an in…nite set. Then ; y k (z) z2Z k and fe i ; E i (z)g i=1;:::;n will also be an equilibrium if the …rst-order conditions for the intermediate e¤ort hold, as well as the following conditions:
P r(y j je 1 ; :::; e n ) R P n i=1 E i (z) d y j (z) = P n i=1 e i + k P j=1 P r(y j je 1 ; :::; e n ) R P n i=1 E i (z) d y j (z) ; (the …rst-order conditions for the …nal-period e¤ort will hold automatically, since we have not changed P y j and E i ). The next step is to show that there exist distributions y with a …nite support such that the …rst-order conditions for the intermediate-period e¤ort, (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold.
Step 4. Take the …rst-order conditions for the intermediate-period e¤ort, (A1) and (A3) (n + k + 1 equations in total: n for the …rst-order conditions for the intermediate-period e¤ort, one for (A1) and k for (A3)) and divide both sides by P k j=1 R d y j (z). The result will be n + k + 1 equations with respect to the variables n y j (z) o z2Z j ; j = 1; :::; k; that say that a constant vector on the left-hand side lies in the convex hull of some set, the points of which are indexed by z 2 Z. Consequently, the left-hand side of this system of equations can be represented as a convex combination of points in this set, where the coe¢ cients of the convex combination are of the form
where Z 0 is a …nite subset of Z. This convex combination de…nes a probability distribution concentrated on a …nite number of points in Z. By Caratheodory's theorem, one can choose such a distribution so that it puts positive probability on not more than n + k + 2 points in Z (since we have n + k + 1 equations).
Step 5. Now let us prove that, without loss of generality, we can say that jZj n + k:
Step 4 proves that there exists an optimal disclosure policy that puts positive probability on at most n + k + 2 signals in Z. Let the equilibrium generated by this optimal disclosure policy be Z ; ; j = 1; :::; k, A is a (n + k) (n + k + 2) matrix (there are n + k constraints, n corresponding to the …rst-order conditions for the intermediate e¤ort and k to (A3)), b 2 R n+k , and c 2 R n+k+2 . If a solution to this problem exists, then there exists an extreme point of the feasible region that is optimal. At any extreme point, at most n + k coordinates of are strictly positive.
